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Case No. 20100582-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JEREMY JAMES DYKES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from an interlocutory order denying a motion to 
dismiss the Information charging him with theft by receiving stolen property, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (West Supp. 
2005). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(d) 
(West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Following a preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over to stand 
trial for theft by receiving a stolen ATV four-wheeler. The theft was charged as 
a second degree felony based, not on value (no such evidence was introduced), 
but on the character of the stolen property as an "operable motor vehicle." In 
district court, Defendant moved to quash the bindover on the ground that an 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ATV is not an "operable motor vehicle." The district court agreed and ruled 
that, because there was no evidence of value, Defendant could only be tried for 
class B misdemeanor theft. The court thereafter dismissed the case for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. The State then filed a new Information charging 
Defendant with third degree felony theft based on the value of the stolen 
property. Defendant moved to dismiss the case under State v. Brichey, 714 P.2d 
644 (Utah 1986), but the magistrate denied the motion. 
Issue. Does state due process, as articulated in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 
644 (Utah 1986), and its progeny, bar the State from filing a new Information 
charging Defendant with theft by receiving stolen property, a third degree 
felony, based on the value of the stolen property? 
Standard of Review. Whether state due process bars the filing of a 
criminal information is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Rogers, 2006 UT 85, \7,151 P.3d 171 (holding that "[t]he interpretation of case 
law presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-408 (West Supp. 2005); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (West 2004). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Informations Charging Second Degree Felony Theft by Receiving 
On April 7, 2009, Defendant was found driving a stolen ATV four-
wheeler on Redwood Road in West Valley City. See 1R116. Three days later, 
the State charged Defendant with theft by receiving stolen property, a second 
degree felony. 2R115. However, the case was dismissed on June 25, 2009 
when the State's key witness failed to appear for the preliminary hearing. See 
2R115. 
Two weeks later, on July 10, 2009, the State refiled the case against 
Defendant. See 1R2-3 (Addendum B). The theft was charged as a second 
degree felony under the alternative theories that ''the value of the property was 
or exceeded $5,000 or the property stolen was a firearm or an operable motor 
vehicle/' 1R2. However, at the preliminary hearing on September 3,2009, the 
State proceeded only on the theory that the stolen ATV was an operable motor 
vehicle. See 1R116:18 (Addendum C). After taking evidence, the magistrate 
bound Defendant over for trial as charged. 1R13-14. 
Once in district court, Defendant moved to quash the bindover, arguing 
that an ATV is not an operable motor vehicle under section 76-6-412 (West 
1
 The record on appeal includes the trial record in two district court 
cases: Case No. 091905392 FS ("1R"), and Case No. 101901771 FS ("2R"). 
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2004). 1R18-43. The State countered that even if an ATV is not an "operable 
motor vehicle" under the statute, the Court should still bind the case over as a 
class A misdemeanor. See 1R48. In support, the State submitted an affidavit 
from the ATV's owner as evidence that its value "probably was between $300 
and $1,000." lR48,52-53. The district court concluded that an ATV is not an 
operable motor vehicle under the statute, refused to consider additional 
evidence, and reduced the felony charge to a class B misdemeanor. See 1R54. 
On Defendant's motion, the charges were thereafter dismissed in district court 
for lack of jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102(8) (2008). 1R66-68. 
Information Charging Third Degree Felony Theft by Receiving 
On March 9,2010, the State filed a new information charging Defendant 
with theft by receiving stolen property. 2R1-2 (Addendum B). This time, 
however, the theft was charged as a third degree felony under the theory that 
the stolen property "was or exceeded $1,000, but was less than $5,000.,/ 2R1. 
Defendant moved to dismiss the Information, arguing that it was filed in 
violation of state due process under State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). 
2R21-81. After a hearing, the magistrate denied the motion to dismiss in a 
written Ruling and Order. 2R103-06 (Addendum D). This Court granted 
Defendant's petition for interlocutory appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State originally charged Defendant with theft by receiving stolen 
property, i.e., a stolen ATV four-wheelera second degree felony. At the 
preliminary hearing, the State proceeded on the theory that the theft was a 
second degree felony based on the character of the stolen property— an ATV 
four-wheeler — as an operable motor vehicle. The magistrate bound Defendant 
over for trial as charged. In district court, Defendant moved to quash the 
bindover on the ground that an ATV is not an operable motor vehicle under 
the theft statute. The district court agreed and reduced the theft charge to a 
class B misdemeanor. It then dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The 
State then filed a new Information in district court, but now alleged a third 
degree felony theft by receiving based on the value of the stolen ATV. 
The magistrate correctly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss based on 
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). Because the State charged Defendant 
with third degree felony theft based on a different theory — value — than in the 
original case —operable motor vehicle —it cannot be said that it wras earlier 
dismissed for insufficient evidence and thus Brickey does not apply. Even 
assuming arguendo that Brickey applies, the State's failure to produce evidence 
of value in the original case was no more than an innocent miscalculation 
where (1) the theft by receiving statute does not define motor vehicle, (2) no 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah court has addressed the issue, and (3) Defendant did not challenge at the 
preliminary hearing the State's claim that an ATV is an operable motor vehicle. 
Accordingly, the refiling was justified by good cause. 
ARGUMENT 
STATE DUE PROCESS DOES NOT BAR THE STATE FROM 
CHARGING DEFENDANT WITH THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY 
In denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the March 2010 Information, 
the magistrate in this case ruled that the State had "good cause in refiling" 
because it "seemingly innocently miscalculated the evidence" in initially 
pursuing the theft charge as a second degree felony. See 2R104-05. The 
magistrate ruled that "[ojther than [the State's] certain doggedness to refile this 
matter, ostensibly to protect the rights of the victim, the facts do not indicate 
that the prosecution engaged in abusive practices in refiling the charges." 
2R105. The magistrate concluded that the State "has not engaged in forum 
shopping, the refiling does not appear to be a tactic to withhold evidence from 
the defense, and, based upon the original bindover . . . , the charges are not 
groundless or improvident." 2R105. This Court should affirm. 
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A. The Brickey rule bars refiling only when potential abusive 
practices are involved. 
Under article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution," defendants [have] 
the right to a preliminary hearing for indictable offenses/' which include 
felonies and class A misdemeanors. State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, ^21,29, 
Utah Adv. Rep. . "At the preliminary hearing, the State bears the 
burden of presenting sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the 
crime has been committed and that the accused has committed it/7 State v. 
Pacheco-Ortega, 2011 UT App 186, f 10,257 P.3d 498; accord Utah Const, art. I, § 
12 (stating that unless otherwise provided by statute, "the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists"). If the 
prosecution meets that burden, the magistrate binds defendant over for trial in 
district court. See Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(2). If, on the other hand, the 
prosecution fails to meet its probable cause burden, the magistrate must 
"dismiss the information and discharge the defendant." Utah R. Crim. P. 
7(0(3). 
The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to eliminate unwarranted 
prosecutions and to "relieve the accused from the substantial degradation and 
expense incident to a modern criminal trial when the charges against him are 
unwarranted or the evidence insufficient" State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778,784 
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(Utah 1980). In short, the preliminary examination "acts as a screening device 
to 'ferret o u t . . . groundless and improvident prosecutions/" State v. Brickey, 
7U P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986) (quoting Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783-84). 
As a general proposition, a dismissal for insufficient evidence does "not 
preclude the State from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same 
offense." Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i); accord State v. Morgan, 2001UT 87,110,34 P.3d 
767 (holding that rule 7 "permits refiling as a general proposition"). 
Nevertheless, "the State's ability to refile is not without bounds." Paclieco-
Ortega, 2011 UT App 186, |10. In State v. Brickey, the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that "unbridled prosecutorial discretion to refile charges carries an 
inherent potential for abusive practices, repugnant to a defendant's state due 
process right to fundamental fairness." 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986). The 
Court in Brickey thus held that state "due process considerations prohibit a 
prosecutor from refiling criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient 
evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable 
evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling." Id. 
The Supreme Court has since "provided a working list of potentially 
abusive practices that bar refiling under the Brickey rule, including 'forum 
shopping, repeated filings of groundless and improvident charges for the 
purpose to harass, . . . withholding evidence,.. . [and] refil[ing] a charge after 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
providing no evidence of an essential and clear element of a crime/ " State v. 
Rogers, 2006 UT 85, % 11,151 P.3d 171. The Brickey rule "does not, however, 
indicate any intent to forbid refiling generally or preclude refiling where a 
defendant's due process rights are not implicated/" Morgan, 2001 UT 87, f 15. 
As explained in Morgan, "[t]he lodestar of Brickey.... is fundamental fairness." 
2001 UT 87, «! 15. "[W]hen potential abusive practices are involved, the 
presumption is that due process will bar refiling/7 Id. at ^[16. However, 
"[w]hen potential abusive practices are not involved, . . . there is no 
presumptive bar to refiling." Id.2 
B. The filing of a new Information charging Defendant with third 
degree felony theft did not involve a potential abusive practice. 
Under Utah law, a defendant is guilty of theft by receiving stolen 
property if he or she: (1) "receives, retains, or disposes of the property of 
2
 Other jurisdictions have likewise limited any bar to refiling to instances 
of bad faith. See, e.g. State v. Elling, 506 P.2d 1102, 1103 (Ariz. App. 1973) 
(permitting reprosecution where no forum shopping involved); People v. Sabell, 
708 P.2d 463, 466 (Colo. 1985) (permitting refiling where court found no 
oppressive tactics); State v. Bacon, 791 P.2d 429,433-34 (Ida. 1990) (permitting 
re-prosecution unless there is evidence of bad faith or purposeful harassment); 
Stockwell v. State, 573 P.2d 116, 126 (Ida. 1977) (stating "refiling is not 
prohibited unless done without good cause or in bad faith"); State v. Vargo, 362 
N.W.2d 840, 842-43 (Mich. App. 1985) (holding simple "neglect" rather than 
"deliberate attempt to harass defendant" justified refiling); State v. Dail, 4DA 
N.W.2d 99, 102 (Neb. 1988) (permitting re-prosecution where no forum 
shopping was involved); Chase v. State, 517P.2d 1142,1143 (Okla.Ct.App.1973) 
(holding that mistaken testimony in first preliminary hearing justified refiling). 
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another/7 and (2) "know[s] that [the property] has been stolen, or believ[es] 
that it probably has been stolen." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2008). After 
taking evidence at the preliminary hearing on the July 2009 Information, the 
magistrate found that the evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause of 
both theft elements and bound Defendant over to district court for trial on 
second degree felony theft as charged. See 1R116:18-19 ("finding probable 
cause to bind over" to district court). 
On a subsequent motion to quash the bindover, the district court judge 
agreed that "the probable cause standard [for theft by receiving] was met 
based on the evidence that was provided" at the preliminary hearing. 
2R117:15-16.3 However, the court ultimately dismissed the case "without 
prejudice" for lack of jurisdiction because it concluded that the State had not 
presented sufficient evidence showing that the theft was a second degree 
felony. See 1R117:16; 1R118:5. At the preliminary hearing, the State 
successfully proceeded on the theory that the theft was "a second degree 
felony because the [stolen ATV] was an operable motor vehicle." 1R116:18-19; 
see 76-6-412(1) (a) (ii) (punishing theft as a second degree felony if the stolen 
property is "an operable motor vehicle"). The district court disagreed. It 
3
 Defendant has not challenged this conclusion on appeal. See Aplt. Brf. 
at 14-23. 
-10-
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concluded that the off-road ATV was not a "motor vehicle" based on the 
definition of motor vehicle in section 76-6-410.5, which governs the theft of 
rental vehicles:" 'a self-propelled vehicle that is intended primarily for use and 
operation on the highways/" See 1R118:16 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
410.5 (West 2004)). 
Following the dismissal of the July 2009 Information, the State refiled the 
theft charge against Defendant—this time as a third degree felony based on the 
ATV's value. See 2R1-2. On appeal, Defendant argues that this refiling 
violated the Brickey rule for two reasons. First, he argues that "the State's 
newly proffered evidence [of value] was neither new nor previously 
unavailable — that is, it was available at the time of the preliminary hearing and 
the State was dilatory in assembling it." Aplt. Brf. at 16-17 (emphasis in 
original). Second, Defendant argues that the State "misinterpreted the 
elements of the [theft] offense and failed to produce any evidence on one of 
those elements —a practice . . .condemned] as being potentially abusive." 
Aplt. Brf. at 17-23. Defendant's claims fail. 
As noted, the Brickey rule bars "refiling criminal charges earlier 
dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or 
previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies 
refiling." Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647. A Brickey claim, therefore, involves a two-
-11-
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part inquiry. First, the Court must determine whether the subject criminal 
charges were "earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence." Id.; Paclieco-Ortega, 
2011 UT App 186, f l l (observing that "the Brickey holding was expressly 
limited to instances where criminal charges have previously been dismissed for 
insufficient evidence"). If so, the Court must then determine whether refiling 
is justified based on "new or previously unavailable evidence" or whether 
"other good cause justifies refiling." Id. 
1. The third degree felony theft by receiving charge was not 
earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence of value. 
Defendant's claim fails at the outset because the theft by receiving 
offense — charged as a third degree felony based on the ATV's value—was not 
"earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence" of value. See id. 
In pursuing the theft charge as a second degree felony, the State could 
proceed on any one of four different theories. Under section 76-6-412, a 
defendant is guilty of second degree felony theft if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon . . . at the time of 
the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(a) (West 2004). In its July 2009 Information, the 
State alleged the first two theories in the alternative — that "the value of the 
-12-
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property was or exceeded $5,000 or the property stolen was a firearm or an 
operable motor vehicle/7 1R2. However, at the preliminary hearing, the State 
elected not to proceed on a theory based on value, but only on the theory that 
•"[i]t's a second degree felony because the [ATV's] an operable motor vehicle/' 
1R116:18. As it turned out, the district court concluded that an ATV is not an 
operable motor vehicle, reduced the charge to a class B misdemeanor, and 
thereafter dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. See 1R117:16-18; 1R1185. 
Accordingly, the second degree felony case was not dismissed for insufficient 
evidence of value. The State did not proceed on that theory. It relied solely on 
the theory that the ATV is an " operable motor vehicle" under section 76-6-
412(1) (a) (ii). And it was on that basis that the district court reduced the charge 
to a misdemeanor. 
On appeal, Defendant cites State v. Redd, where the Utah Supreme Court 
held that "[a] presumptively abusive practice occurs when a prosecutor refiles 
a charge after providing no evidence for an essential and clear element of a 
crime at a preliminary hearing." 2001 UT 113, f 20, 37 P.3d 1160. Redd is 
inapposite. In Redd, the Supreme Court observed that to convict a person of 
disinterment of a dead human body, the State must establish the three "clear 
elements" of the offense: (1) "that the dead body was 'buried or otherwise 
interred/" (2) "that the defendant disinterred the body," and (3) "that the 
-13-
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defendant acted intentionally when he or she disinterred the interred dead 
body/' Id. at }^14 (citation omitted). The Court held that because the State 
"failed to provide a scintilla of evidence" on the "clear element" of interment, 
the Brickey rule barred refiling absent a showing of good cause. Id. at \\7. 
Unlike interment under the disinterment statute, the value of stolen 
property is not an "essential" element of theft by receiving when charged as a 
felony. Whether theft is charged as a second degree felony or third degree 
felony may depend on value. See, e.g. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (a) (i) 
(second degree felony if value is $5,000 or more); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
412(l)(b)(i) (third degree felony if value is $1,000 or more but less than $5,000).4 
For example, theft may be punishable as a second degree felony if the "value of 
the property or services is or exceeds $5,000"; or if the "property stolen is a 
firearm or an operable motor vehicle"; or if the defendant "is armed with a 
dangerous weapon . . . at the time of the theft"; or if the "property is stolen 
from the person of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(a). Theft may be 
punishable as a third degree felony if the "value of the property or services is 
or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000"; or if the defendant "has been twice 
4
 Section 76-6-412 was amended in 2010 and now provides that third 
degree felony theft requires a value of $1,500 or more but less than $5,000. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(b)(i) (West Supp. 2010). Misdemeanor theft is 
dependent on value. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(c) (West Supp. 2010). 
-14-
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before convicted of theft, any robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit 
theft"; or if the property taken is one of an enumerated list of animals. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (b). 
In charging second degree felony theft, the State may pursue any of the 
four available theories, and its decision to pursue a particular theory over the 
others does not preclude it from later pursuing, an alternative theory. This is 
particularly true where, as here, the State has already established at the 
previous preliminary hearing the essential elements of the crime of theft by 
receiving. Cf Pacheco-Ortega, 2011 UT App 186, ^11 (holding that the Brickey 
bar to refiling is "expressly limited to instances where criminal charges have 
previously been dismissed for insufficient evidence"). 
2. Even assuming, arguendo, that the third degree felony theft 
by receiving charge was earlier dismissed for insufficient 
evidence of value, "other good cause" justified refiling. 
Even if this Court were to assume, for argument's sake, that the third 
degree felony theft by receiving charge was earlier dismissed for insufficient 
evidence of value, the district court correctly ruled that good cause justified 
refiling. 
As explained, criminal charges earlier dismissed may be refiled if "the 
prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced 
or that otlter good cause justifies refiling." Briclcey, 714 P.2d at 647 (emphasis 
-15-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
added). Brickey's "other good cause" provision "represents a broad category 
with 'new or previously unavailable evidence' as but two examples of 
subcategories that come within its definition." Morgan, 2001 UT 87, \I9. In 
other words," '[o]ther good cause ' . . . simply means additional subcategories, 
other than 'new evidence' or 'previously unavailable evidence/ that justify 
refiling." Id. 
In Morgan, the Utah Supreme Court recognized a prosecutor's "innocent 
miscalculation" of the evidence necessary for bindover as an additional 
subcategory of good cause. Id. In doing so, the Court "emphasize[d] that the 
miscalculation must be innocent, and further investigation must be nondilatory 
and not otherwise infringe on due process rights of a defendant." Id. 
(emphasis in original). The magistrate in this case correctly relied on the 
"innocent miscalculation" subcategory of good cause in concluding that the 
State was not barred from filing the new information charging Defendant with 
third degree felony theft by receiving. See 2R103-06. 
As discussed, the prosecutor originally pursued the theft charge as a 
second degree felony based on the nature of the stolen property as an operable 
motor vehicle, not on the value of the stolen property. See 1R116:18. Although 
the prosecutor was successful in obtaining bindover from the magistrate, the 
district court later concluded that an off-road ATV was not a "motor vehicle" 
-16-
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for purposes of section 76-6-412. 1R117:16. Contrary to Defendant's claim on 
appeal, the magistrate in this case correctly concluded that the prosecutor 
innocently miscalculated the evidence necessary for a second degree felony 
bindover. 
Section 76-6-412 makes it a second degree felony to knowingly receive a 
stolen,"operable motor vehicle/7 but does not define that term. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-412. In moving to quash the bindover, 1R22-24, Defendant 
argued—for the first time —that ''motor vehicle" as used in section 76-6-
412(1) (a)(ii), should be given the same meaning it is given in section 76-6-410.5, 
to wit,."a self-propelled vehicle that is intended primarily for use and 
operation on the highways/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-410.5 (West 2004). The 
district court accepted this argument and, because no evidence of value was 
introduced at the preliminary hearing, reduced the charge to a class B 
misdemeanor. See 1R117:16-18. Notwithstanding the district court's ruling, it 
is far from clear that the Legislature intended that the term "motor vehicle" in 
section 76-6-412 have the same meaning that it is given in section 76-6-410.5. 
Indeed, this issue has never been decided by either this Court or the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
The district court may have decided the issue correctly. As noted by that 
court, section 76-6-412 is in the same part of the Criminal Code as section 76-6-
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410.5. See 1R117:16. Sometimes, this suggests that the terms should share the 
same meaning. But a review of Title 76, chapter 6, part 4 suggests otherwise. 
Part 4 includes a list of definitions for terms used in that part generally, but 
"motor vehicle" is not among them. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (West 
2004). That term is only defined under section 76-6-410.5, which defines the 
offense of theft of a rental vehicle. This would suggest that the definition used 
therein is specific to rental vehicle thefts. Otherwise, the definition would have 
been, found in the list of definitions for part 4 generally. It would seem, 
therefore, that "motor vehicle" should be given its broader, ordinary meaning, 
i.e., a vehicle with a motor. See Envirocare of Utah v. Utah State Tax Common, 
2009 UT 1, \5, 201 P.3d 982 (holding that "[w]hen a term is not defined by 
statute, we look to its common usage to define it").5 
Indeed, at the time of the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor proceeded 
on the theory that an off-road ATV is a motor vehicle under section 76-6-412. 
5
 Moreover, the State's review of the Utah Criminal Code reveals that 
only section 76-6-410.5 limits the definition of "motor vehicle" to self-propelled 
vehicles that are primarily for use on the highways. Seef e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-207(1)(b) (West Supp. 2009) (defining motor vehicle as a "self-propelled 
vehicle"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207.5(1)(b) (West Supp. 2009) (same); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-2202(1)(c) (West Supp. 2011) (same). As noted by 
Defendant in his motion to quash the bindover, in other provisions throughout 
the Code, "motor vehicle" is alternatively defined as either a self-propelled 
vehicle or a self-propelled vehicle primarily for use on the highways. See 1R23. 
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See 1R116:18. Counsel for Defendant did not argue otherwise and the 
magistrate agreed to bind the matter over as charged based on that theory. See 
1R116:17-19. Defendant did not claim that an off-road ATV is not a motor 
vehicle under section 76-6-412 until after the bindover in district court See 
1R22-24. Had Defendant raised the issue at the preliminary hearing, rather 
than in a motion to quash in district court, the State could have sought a short 
continuance to secure evidence establishing this alternative theory. See Rogers, 
2006 UT 85, f 21 (holding that "it would be reasonable to grant a continuance 
when the prosecution, in good faith, fails to present sufficient evidence but the 
necessary evidence is reasonably available"). Defendant's failure to raise this 
challenge at a time when the prosecution could have responded also 
constitutes good cause justifying the filing of the new information. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted November 21, 2011. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
3Y S.GRAY 
dis tan t Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (West Supp. 2005) 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of 
the property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing 
that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or 
aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from the 
owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the 
owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is 
presumed in the case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen 
on a separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year 
preceding the receiving offense charged; or 
(c) is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business 
dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or 
personal property, or an agent, employee, or representative of a 
pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains property 
and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the 
property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at 
the bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one positive form of identification. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business 
dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or 
personal property, and every agent, employee, or representative of a 
pawnbroker or person who fails to comply with the requirements of 
Subsection (2) (c) is presumed to have bought, received, or obtained 
the property knowing it to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. 
This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the 
evidence that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has 
or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand 
merchandise or personal property, or was an agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person, that the defendant 
bought, received, concealed, or withheld the property without 
A-l 
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obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then the 
burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property 
bought, received, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(c), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal 
processors as defined in Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) " Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or 
selling goods. 
(b) "Pawnbroker" means a person who: 
(i) loans money on deposit of personal property, or deals 
in the purchase, exchange, or possession of personal property 
on condition of selling the same property back again to the 
pledge or depositor; 
(ii) loans or advances money on personal property by 
taking chattel mortgage security on the property and takes or 
receives the personal property into his possession and who 
sells the unredeemed pledges; or 
(iii) receives personal property in exchange for money or 
in trade for other personal property. 
(c) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or 
lending on the security of the property. 
A-2 
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Utah Code Ann. 76-6-412 (West 2004) 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter 
shall be punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor 
vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined 
in Section 76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds 
$1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, 
any robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, 
the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cowf 
heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, 
swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal raised for commercial 
purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property 
stolen is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property 
stolen is less than $300. 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-
6-413, or commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-
412(1)(b) (iii), is civilly liable for three times the amount of actual 
damages, if any sustained by the plaintiff, and for costs of suit and 
reasonable attorneys1 fees. 
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LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CLIFFORD ROSS, Bar No. 2802 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 E. BROADWAY, SUITE #400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEREMY JAMES DYKES 
DOB: 12/30/1979, 
4172 West Paynter Cove 
WVC,UT 84128 
OTN 
SO# 0317266 
Defendant. 
Screened by: CLIFFORD ROSS 
Assigned to: CLIFFORD ROSS (Tuesday) 
DAO# 09023068 
Bail: $10,000 
[Warrant/Release: Non-Jail 
INFORMATION 
ICaseNo. 
The undersigned C. Lance - West Valley Police Department, Agency Case No. 
09101.4357, upon a written affidavit states on information and belief that the defendant, JEREMY 
JAMES DYKES, committed the crime of: 
COUNT 1 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, (345)76-6-408 UCA, second degree felony, 
as follows: That on or about April 07, 2009 at 3725 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah the defendant received, retained or disposed of property of another, knowing that 
the property had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, or concealed, sold or 
withheld or aided in concealing, selling or withholding the property, knowing the property had 
been stolen, intending to deprive the owner thereof, and the value of the property was or 
exceeded S5,000 or the property stolen was a firearm or an operable motor vehicle. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Danny Robb, Karen Robb, P. Plese, C. Lance, Dusty Ha, Wes Dudley, Mark Dell, 
Terrence Chen 
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INFORMATION 
DAONo. 09023068 
Page 2 
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE: 
Your affiant bases this Information upon the following: 
The statement of Karen Robb, to Nephi City Police Officer W. Dudley, that she lives at 
689 South 200 East, Nephi, Juab County, Utah. At approximately 7:00 p.m., on January 7, 2009, 
Ms. Robb's trailer with two 4-wheelers on it was parked in front of her home. When Ms. Robb 
checked the next morning, she found that the trailer and both 4-wheelers were missing. Ms. 
Robb further stated that one of the 4-wheelers, a 2004 Honda, belonged to her brother-in-law, 
Danny Robb. 
The written report of West Valley City Police Officer P. Plese that on April 7, 2009, he 
observed a 4-wheeler being driven in traffic at 3725 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. Officer Plese had the driver, defendant Jeremy James Dykes, pull over. A records check 
revealed that the 4-wheeler was the one stolen from Danny Robb. 
Authorized for presentment and filing 
/? 
LOHRA^t/MILLER, District Attorney 
lieputy District AtferfTey 
26th day of June, 2009 
GAM / DAO # 09023068 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 46-5-101 
(2007) I declare under criminal penalty of the State 
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the 
best of my belief and knowledge. 
(1 Executed-o'm) ,^\L^^^P Z& ZtfOf 
Affiant S(-<?* PA^ Cff/^iZL 
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LOHRA L. MILLER. 6420 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CLIFFORD ROSS, Bar No. 2802 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 E. BROADWAY, SUITE #400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
FILED BISTIIIC? COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 0 9 2010 
SALT LAKE COUNTY , 
By WV 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JEREMY JAMES DYKES 
DOB 12/30/1979, 
AKANONE 
4172 West Paynter Cove 
WVC, UT 84128 
D.L.# 159733669 
OTN 
SO# 0317266 
Defendant. 
* 
Screened by: CLIFFORD ROSS 
Assigned to: CLIFFORD ROSS (Tuesday) 
DAO# 10007190 
SUMMONS TO BE ISSUED 
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 
101901111 
The undersigned C. Lance - West Valley Police Department, Agency Case No. 
091014357, upon a written affidavit states on information and belief that the defendant, JEREMY 
JAMES DYKES, committed the crime of: 
COUNT 1 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, (348) 76-6-408 UCA, third degree felony, as 
follows: That on or about April 07, 2009 at 3725 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah the defendant received, retained or disposed of property of another, knowing that 
the property had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, or concealed, sold or 
withheld or aided in concealing, selling or withholding the property, knowing the property had 
been stolen, intending to deprive the owner thereof, and the value of said property was or 
exceeded $1,000, but was less than $5,000 or the defendant had been twice before convicted of 
theft, robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit theft. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Terrence Chen, Mark Dell, Wes Dudley, Dusty Ha, C. Lance, P. Plese, Karen Robb, 
Danny Robb 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INFORMATION 
DAONo. 10007190 
Page 2 . 
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE: 
Your affiant bases this Information upon the following: 
The statement of Karen Robb, to Nephi City Police Officer W. Dudley, that she lives at 
689 South 200 East, Nephi, Juab County, Utah. At approximately 7:00 p.m., on January 7, 2009, 
Ms. Robb's trailer with two 4-wheelers on it was parked in front of her home. When Ms. Robb 
checked the next morning, she found that the trailer and both 4-wheelers were missing. Ms. 
Dudley further stated that one of the 4-wheelers, a 2004 Honda, belonged to her brother-in-law, 
Danny Robb. 
The written report of West Valley City Police Officer P. Plese that on April 7, 2009, he 
observed a 4-wheeler being driven in traffic at 3725 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. Officer Plese had the driver, defendant Jeremy James Dykes, pull over. A records check 
revealed that the 4-wheeler was the one stolen from Danny Robb. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 46-5-101 
(2007) I declare under criminal penalty of the State 
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the 
best of my belief and knowledge. 
Executed on: 2)Q)>a 
•-C LANCE 
Affiant 
Authorized for presentment and filing 
LOHRAl/ MILLER, District Attorney 
Dfeput^ DisWfAttorney 
3rd day of March, 2010 
GAM/DAO# 10007190 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEREMY JAMES DYKES, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 091905392 FS 
Appellate Case No. 20100582 
PRELIMINARY HEARING SEPTEMBER 3,2009 
BEFORE 
JUDGE ROBERT K. HILDER 
RLED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURT^ 
CAROLYNERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT T R A N S C R I B E
 w m | C T m 
1775 East Ellen Way " 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
~a ^ 
H i Bail Rf 
SALT LAKE COUNTY A A \f\ 
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APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: CLIFFORD C. ROSS, IH 
Assistant District Attorney 
For the Defendant: ELIZABETH A. LORENZO 
Attorney at Law 
* * * 
INDEX 
WITNESS 
PATRICK PLESE 
Direct Examination by Mr. Ross 
Cross Examination by Ms. Lorenzo 
Redirect Examination by Mr. Ross 
Re-Cross Examination by Ms. Lorenzo 
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CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 3, 2009 
JUDGE ROBERT K. HILDER 
(Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: You ready to go? 
MR. ROSS: We are. Cliff Ross for the State. 
THE COURT: This is in the matter of State v. 
Jeremy James Dykes. Is he in custody? I'm sorry, I couldn't 
see you. I'm used to looking another direction in my 
courtroom. Okay. This is case number 091905392. Mr. 
Clifford Ross for the state, Ms. Elizabeth Lorenzo for the • 
defendant. 
Do you waive reading today, counsel? 
MS. LORENZO: Yes, Judge. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Go ahead and call your 
witness. 
MR. ROSS: Officer Plese, ask him to step forward. 
MS. LORENZO: I'm sorry, just quickly before the 
record, before he takes the stand, we do have potentially one 
witness that we might call at trial, so I asked her to step 
outside the courtroom. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
/// 
/// 
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PATRICK PLESE 
Having first been duly'sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ROSS: 
Q Good morning. 
A Good morning. 
Q State your name and employment please? 
A Patrick Plese. I work for West Valley Police 
Department. 
Q, And spell your last name. 
A . It's P-L-E-S-E." 
Q And how long have you worked there? 
A For West Valley since 1997. . 
Q And what are your duties in that work? 
A Right now I'm a traffic enforcement officer on 
motor division. 
Q Okay. Drawing your attention to April 7,'2009, 
or near 3725 South Redwood Road, were you on duty in that 
location? 
.A Yes, I was. 
Q And that location is within Salt Lake County? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q What occurred? 
A I was monitoring traffic mainly north and 
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southbound on Redwood Road. I observed a four-wheeler coming 
through the intersection at 3800 South and Redwood. Four-
wheeler was traveling actually eastbound from 38th South and 
turned northbound onto Redwood Road. 
Q Okay. And what did you notice about the vehicle or 
the manner in which it was being operated? 
A Well, it was an off-road vehicle and it turned 
northbound onto Redwood Road and turned into number three 
travel lane and proceeded northbound on Redwood Road. 
Q Okay. Did it have plates or registration for being 
operated on the highways? 
A Once I stopped it, no. I've never seen one. That 
type of four-wheeler can't be registered. There's no way to 
make it road legal in Utah. 
Q Okay. So you determined that to be some type of 
violation? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Okay. And you - did you observe the speed of the. 
vehicle? Was there anything unusual about that or the 
manner-
A No. 
Q - of it's operation? 
A ; No, just the manner of the vehicle, it can't go on 
the road. 
Q Okay. So you pulled it over? 
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1 A Yes, I did. 
2 Q And how many people were on it? 
3 A One. 
4 Q And do you recognize that person in court today? 
5• A I do. 
6 Q Point him out please. 
7 • A He's sitting at the table there. 
8 . Q What's, he wearing for the record? 
9 A A plaid shirt, glasses, levis. 
10 MR. ROSS: May the record reflect -
11 • THE COURT: The record will reflect identification. 
12 MR. ROSS: Thank you. '. -' 
•13 Q (BY MR. ROSS) Go on and describe what you observed 
14 and what occurred. 
15 A I was on my motorcycle, I got off my motorcycle and 
16 just walked down into the number three travel lane. As the 
17 four-wheeler got closer and I just pointed to pull into the 
18 driveway where I was sitting, which it did. 
19 Q Okay. 
20 A. As it pulled into the driveway I noticed it had -
21 it had several different colors of paint, and some of the 
22 paint was peeling off. You could see the factory yellow that 
23 I Honda has on a lot of their motorcycle and four-wheelers was 
24 still showing on part of the four-wheeler.. 
25 Q Okay. And what was the four-wheeler if you could 
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describe 
1 ' A 
to be a 
Q 
it in more detail? It was a brand name? 
It was a Honda. It wasn't brand new. It appeared 
few years old. Appeared to be in decent condition. 
Okay. So did you have any discussion with the.. 
driver at that point? 
A 
Q 
A 
from him 
his name 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes, I did.' 
What did he say? What did you say? 
Well, the first thing I did was get identification 
I believe he provided a Utah driver's license with 
and a date of birth on it. • 
And that would be Jeremy James Dykes? 
Yes, date of birth 12/30/79. 
Okay. Did you have any discussion with him about 
how he came to be riding that particular vehicle? 
A 
he told 
Q . 
Oh yeah, I asked him if it was his four-wheeler and 
me it was. 
Okay. And did you investigate to determine who the 
record owner was? 
•
 A 
Q 
1 A 
yes. I 
no. 
Q 
A 
Yes, I did.' 
What did you do and what did you determine? 
I asked him if it was his four-wheeler, he said 
asked him if it was registered to him, and he said 
Okay. 
So I asked him who it was registered to and I asked 
• . . 5 
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him to find the registration on the vehicle for me. He did 
find the registration and he did give it to me. 
Q Okay. 
A • I looked at the registration. He told me that the 
vehicle he had bought from the registered owner Gary Smith. 
The registration showed that it was registered to a Myrna 
Robb. 
Q Okay. And how did you go about determining the 
registered owner? 
A Well, I checked the VIN number on the registration 
against the VIN number on the. four-wheeler and it matched. 
Q Okay. I've - I've given you - did he - did the 
defendant say anything else in addition to that concerning 
how he came to be in possession of that ATV? 
A No. 
• Q All right. I've shown you before you took the 
stand a witness statement signed by a Danny Robb? 
A Yes. 
Q And have you read through that and determined the 
VIN number and the description of the 2004 Honda factory 
yellow rancher model ATV was - was accurate and that this 
statement refers to that ATV? 
A Yes. 
MR. ROSS: Okay. Your Honor, I'd offer this under 
Rule 1102, statement of the owner. 
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Ms. 
THE 
Lorenzo? 
MS. 
COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
LORENZO: I just object to the 
mean, things are written out or that's, you 
and then [inaudible]. 
THE COURT: The interlineations we 
be pompous. That one? 
MS. 
'THE 
MR. 
Your Honor. 
to 
you 
you 
! sto 
out 
cus 
THE 
receive it 
Q 
LORENZO: Yes. 
COURT: Okay. 
ROSS: The crossed out things 
COURT: I see they're initiale 
Any objection, 
changing, I 
know, crossed off 
like to say to 
were initialed, 
d and I'm going 
for purposes of this hearing only. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit ? received) 
MR. 
(BY 
ROSS: All right. 
MR. ROSS) What else transacted there between 
and the defendant? What else did he say 
do be 
A 
len. 
Q 
A 
fore you left the scene? 
Well, I had dispatch check the VIN 
And what did you learn? 
Dispatch told me it was listed as 
of Nephi. 
Q 
tody? 
All 
? What else did 
number for 
a stolen vehicle 
right. Did you take the defendant into 
7 
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A Yes, I did. 
Q All right. Did you, from reading the or from the 
statements from other officers involved in the case, did you 
get any information about what occurred in Nephi? 
A A little bit, yes. 
Q Okay. And this is from other officers in Nephi 
reporting or giving you that information? 
A . Yes. 
Q What did you learn as far as the vehicle in 
question was concerned and what occurred to it in Nephi? 
.A - I spoke on the phone to the officer from Nephi. He 
told me that two four-wheelers and a trailer had been stolen. 
And he told me he was on his way to Salt Lake County to try 
and interview the person that I had placed in custody. 
Q All right. 
Your Honor, I'd also offer at this time another 
Rule 1102 statement from Karen Robb who's the owner of the 
trailer and the other ATV, which together with the subject 
ATV were taken without her consent.- were stolen basically 
from her home in Nephi. I've given counsel a copy. 
MS. LORENZO: And, Your Honor, I just object to the 
stuff that's not relevant. He's not charged with anything 
with regards to those. 
THE COURT: What is the relevance, counsel? 
MR. ROSS: That he knew the property was stolen. 
. 8 
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THE COURT:. It appears he showed knowledge and 
intent/ I guess. I'll receive it -
MR. ROSS: I'll submit it. 
THE COURT: - for purposes of this hearing only. 
Cross-examine. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit ? received) 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS. LORENZO: 
Q The other ATV, not the one from Mr. Robb, but the 
other one - the other I think one plus a trailer, he wasn't 
found in possession of; is that correct? 
A . That's correct. ^ 
Q He was just with the one VIN number that you've 
seen referenced in the Danny Robb 1102? 
A Yes. 
Q And did you have someone go out and check his 
residence for those other ATVs? 
A I did. 
Q . You did. And were they there? 
A No. 
Q Okay. So going back to your initial encounter with 
him, would you say it was unusual to see an ATV on the road? 
A Very unusual. 
Q And clearly caught your attention? 
A Yes. 
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1 I Q And that's why you initiated a traffic stop? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q And when you did that, you I think you actually say 
4 you just pointed to the driver to pull over? 
5 A Uh-huh (affirmative). Yes, ma'am. 
6 . Q . And he followed your direction? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q And he pulled over into a driveway before you even 
9 parked? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And is it fair to say he was cooperative with you? 
12• ' A Yes. 
13 • Q He provided you with his driver's license? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q He assisted you in trying to find a registration? 
16 • A Yes. . 
17 Q. He - of which he actually didn't know where it was, 
18 the registration; is that fair to say? 
19 A Yes, it took him a minute to find it. 
20 Q And he had to go through some type of paperwork or 
21 not in the - he had to go get it out of a different 
22 I compartment or something; is that correct? 
23 A Yes, that's correct. 
24 Q ' And I think you say it took him several minutes to 
25 find the registration. 
10 
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A Yes. 
Q But when you asked him initially he said that he 
bought it from, Gary Smith, 
A Yes. 
Q And that it was his ATV. 
A Yes. 
Q Did you ever ask him if he'd seen the registration 
before? 
A No. 
Q So you don't know if he'd ever seen that it was 
registered to someone different? 
A I have no idea. 
Q And you would agree with me that in order to be 
guilty of this he has to either know that this was stolen or 
believe that it probably had been stolen? 
MR. ROSS: A legal opinion. Objection. 
THE COURT: The officer did make some ' 
determinations based on his training and experience, to the 
extent you wish to offer that opinion. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, as far as I understand the 
statute, you would need to know that it's a stolen vehicle. 
Q (BY MS. LORENZO) And so, I mean, you arrested him 
for this? 
A Yes. 
Q What led you'to believe that he knew it was a 
11 
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1 stolen vehicle? 
2 . A Well, I - I can speak for myself. I don't get on 
3 any vehicle or drive any vehicle that I don't know where it 
4 came from or who owns it. 
5 Q Okay. But not speaking for yourself, what about 
6 him? What led you to believe that he knew it was stolen? 
7 A . Well, he's an adult with a driver's license and 
8 he's driving the vehicle. 
9 Q Okay. So the fact that he was in possession of it 
10 was the only reason you thought he knew? 
11 A Sure. 
12 Q . Because you didn't - you didn't ask him about the 
13 registration of seeing it before? 
14 J A No. ' 
15 Q Whether or not he'd seen it? 
16 A No. 
17 I Q Did you ask him if he knew the Myrna Robb? 
18 A; . No. 
19 Q And so what you also indicated the fact that he was 
20 I in possession, that was - that would be why you think he 
21 probably ought to have known it was stolen? 
22 A . Well, that's one - one small part. I can give you 
23. the - probably several different why I believe it was stolen 
24 right from the beginning. 
25 I Q Not why you believe but what he believed it was 
12 
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stolen. 
known? 
THE COURT: What he believed that he should have 
MS- LORENZO: Right. 
THE WITNESS: The way you're asking the question, 
all I can tell you is I would believe, not only as a police 
officer 
streets 
Q 
A 
the veh 
Q 
A 
Q 
reason 
i A 
• " '
 Q 
. A 
person 
reason 
way it 
Q. 
but as a person that drives any vehicle on the 
anywhere like most people -
(BY MS. LORENZO) Okay. 
- there's things that would lead me to believe that 
icle is either should be on the road or shouldn't. 
Okay. But what about with regards to Mr. Dykes? 
I can't tell you what he thinks. 
So you don't know of any, I mean, you have no 
to think that he personally knew that it was stolen? 
Yes, I do. 
What? 
The paint that was on that vehicle any reasonable 
could have looked at that and realized that there's no 
to basically ruin the paint of a very nice vehicle the 
had been ruined. 
But you have no idea if he put that paint on or how 
: that paint go there? 
A 
Q 
I have no idea. 
Other than the paint, any other reason other than 
13 
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1 the paint? 
2 A I'm sorry, you're going to have to clarify that. 
3 I'm not exactly sure -
4 Q You said there were several reasons. I'm wondering 
5 if there's any other reason other than the paint? 
6 A Yes. I have yet in my entire career to find an 
7 adult riding a vehicle like that that should be off-road on a 
8 seven-lane highway through the middle of the city. It's 
9 very, very abnormal. 
10 Q I mean someone who is likely to get caught by doing 
11 that, right? * 
12 J A • I would think so. 
13 Q Someone who is out in the open doing that is not 
14 thinking that I'm going to get, I mean, knowing that they're 
15 probably going to get pulled over by the police? 
16 A If I was - I . can answer this way. If I was riding 
17 that vehicle down Redwood Road, especially that time of day, 
18 I would expect to encounter a police officer. 
19 . .Q . And he wasn't trying to hide himself or his . 
20 identity or himself on that vehicle? 
21 A I don't think so. 
22 Q Did you do any investigation as to Gary Smith? 
23 A No. 
24 Q So you - you didn't go to look and see if Gary 
25 Smith existed? 
14 
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A Gary Smith, sure, I read him Miranda. I want to 
talk to him, he wouldn't talk to me. I can't do anything 
with the name Gary Smith. 
Q Okay. But, okay, so you didn/t investigate whether 
or not a Gary Smith, in fact, existed? 
A No. I'm sure there's a Gary Smith in Utah, but 
there's a phone book full of them. • 
MS. LORENZO: May I have just one moment, Judge? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MS. LORENZO: I don't think I have anything further 
at this time. 
THE COURT: Any re-direct on this one? 
MR. ROSS: Briefly. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ROSS: 
Q Did the defendant produce a certificate of title 
showing he owned the vehicle? 
A No. 
Q And whose name was the registration, do you know? 
A Yeah, it was the Myrna Robb. 
Q Okay. Not Gary Smith? 
A No. 
Q Okay. Do you have any information from any record 
of any type connecting a Gary Smith to this vehicle? 
A No. 
15 
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1 Q You have this 1102 from the owner that said they 
2 owned it, they didn't give permission, don't you? 
3 A Correct. 
4 MR. ROSS: Nothing further. We'll submit it. 
5 RE-CROSS EXAMINATION ' 
6 BY MS. LORENZO: 
7 Q Did you look for a Gary Smith that owned this 
8 vehicle? 
9 A No, ma'am. 
10 MS. LORENZO: All right.- Nothing further. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you, officer. You may step down, 
12 sir. 
13 Any more witnesses for the State? 
14 MR. ROSS: The State rests on the evidence. 
15 . THE COURT: Defense? 
16 . -MS. LORENZO: Yes, Judge, I don't think that 
17 there's been sufficient evidence for a probable cause -
18 determination that my client either knew or probably should 
19 have known that this was stolen. He told the officer that he 
20 bought it from a Gary Smith. He knew that it wasn't 
21 registered in his name. He had, I mean, he knew that he had 
22 never looked at the registration before. I would think a 
23 I paint job is sufficient to say that that's - we don't even 
24 know if he did the paint job or where that paint job came 
25 from, to say that someone probably ought to have known it's 
16 
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stolen. I think that's the really only basis -
THE COURT: You don't think the paint job that / 
maybe the officer's really saying something like the broken 
steering column, someone had punched out? One of those 
things [inaudible], this doesn't make sense? 
MS. LORENZO: I think that -
THE COURT: Under the very lowest probable cause 
standard, but -
MS. LORENZO: Right. I mean, and he might be able 
to do that, but I don't think that that's sufficient. I 
mean, a paint job in and of itself coming is not probable 
cause that someone should have known it was stolen. And 
that's the point I just think that could have come from him 
or any other, you know, from when it was purchased by my 
client. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MS. LORENZO: Additionally, I don't think there's 
been any evidence of value that's been submitted in this 
charge that's something to exceed $5,000. And so I don't 
think it should be bound over. For those two reasons that -
THE COURT: You don't think it should be bound over 
or not at that level. It certainly could be bound over at 
that level or - or [inaudible]? 
• MS. LORENZO: That's correct, Judge, because I 
don't think there's been probable cause that he knew or 
17 
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1 probably should have known that it was stolen, and then I 
2 don't think there's been any evidence submitted of. value. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Ross? 
4 MR. ROSS: It's a second degree felony because the 
. 5 items an operable motor vehicle. Value is an alternative. 
6 THE COURT: Not value based, an alternative? 
7 MS. LORENZO: That's not how it's charged. 
8 THE COURT: Let's have a look. 
9 MR. ROSS: Well, theft by receiving on or about 
10 April 7 -
11 THE COURT: Well, the property stolen was a firearm 
12 or an operable vehicle. That's what the information says. 
13 MR. ROSS: And the • - • • ' . 
14 I MS. LORENZO: I don't have that. 
15 THE COURT: I don't think it's an amendment, but 
16 that's the information. 
17 MS. LORENZO: Okay. Yes, Your Honor. 
18 MR. ROSS: I'll submit it. I think the court has 
19 it in hand. 
20 THE COURT: I think with that issue and that was 
21 interesting one on the value [inaudible] but you're 
22 absolutely right, there was no evidence. But with the 
23 operable motor vehicle as the officer said he couldn't 
24 operated it where it was, but it was operating, but I think 
25 the officer, actually I think that there's a number of 
18. 
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factors but the paint alone, I mean, this is something in the 
officer's experience or their basis to say now, why does that 
makes sense? It's certainly enough for the low cause - low 
level of proof requirement to bind over on a preliminary 
hearing, so I am finding probable cause to bind over setting 
it before Judge Christiansen for further proceedings. 
COURT CLERK: September 25th, 9:00 a.m., Judge 
Christiansen. 
THE COURT: Do you wish to withdraw the 1102fs? 
MR. ROSS; May I? Thank you. 
. THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. ROSS: May I excuse the officer? 
THE COURT: You may. 
And thank you, Officer. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
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ADDENDUM D 
Ruling and Order [on Brickey motion] J H 
(dated July 1,2010) ™ 
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' " " a Judicial Dfet'rtoV' 
JUL 0 l 2010 
SALT LAKE COUNT 
: : ;
 ; ; in 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEREMY JAMES DYKES, 
Defendant. 
• • . 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 101901771 
Judge Michele M. Christiansen 
Date: July 1,2010 
The above matter came before the court for decision on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
submitted June 22, 2010 on the grounds that it was re-filed in violation of the State v. Brickey, 
714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). Being fully advised, the court makes the following ruling: 
The Court finds that because the prosecutor innocently miscalculated the quantum of 
evidence and the defense is unable to show that the prosecution engaged in abusive practices in 
miscalculating the evidence, dismissal pursuant to State v. Brickey is inappropriate because no 
presumptive bar to refiling exists. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3) allows a magistrate to dismiss and discharge a defendant if the 
State's evidence fails to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the 
charged crime, but Rule 7 also allows the State to refile as "dismissal and discharge do not 
preclude the State from instituting subsequent prosecution for the same offense." However, state 
due process protections prohibit a "prosecutor from refilling criminal charges earlier dismissed 
for insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable 
<f 
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evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refilling." State v. Brickey 714 P.2d 644, 
647 (Utah 1986). 
The primary purposes underlying the Brickey rule is to preclude a prosecutor from 
seeking an unfair advantage over a defendant through forum shopping by harassing a defendant 
through repeated filings of groundless and improvident charges, or from withholding evidence. 
State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, \ 15, 34 P.3d 767 (emphasis added). 
The Brickey analysis indicates that "new or previously unavailable evidence" and "good 
cause" represent two broad categories that allow for refilling and "other good cause." The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that "good cause" may exist "when a prosecutor innocently 
miscalculates the quantum of evidence" required to obtain a bind over. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, % 
14. And while the Utah Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor's innocent miscalculation of 
the necessary quantum of evidence is sufficient grounds to refile, due process violations are not 
necessarily implicated when charges are refilled as long as the miscalculation is innocent and 
further investigation does not violate due process rights of the defendant. Id. at f^ 19. 
The State first filed charges against the defendant in April 2009, but the case wras 
dismissed without prejudice because the State's witnesses were not present. At the September 3, 
2009, preliminary hearing, the second time the State filed charges against the defendant, the 
Judge found probable cause to bind the matter over as charged as a Second Degree Felony. After 
the Court denied the State's request to re-open the Preliminary Hearing and bound the case over 
as a class B misdemeanor, the State filed the current matter a third time as a Third Degree 
Felony. And while the defense has not received new or previously unavailable evidence, Brickey 
allows for refiling for "other good cause." Here, the prosecution has good cause in refiling as 
they seemingly innocently miscalculated the evidence in filing the original Second Degree felony 
2 
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charges that subsequently led to the State filing the charges as a Third Degree Felony. This 
Court originally found that the matter would not be bound over as a second degree felony 
because an ATV is not an operable motor vehicle, and when the case was bound over as a class 
B misdemeanor, the court granted Defense Counsel's Motion to dismiss based on lack of 
jurisdiction. Other than certain doggedness to refile this matter, ostensibly to protect the rights 
of the victim, the facts do not indicate that the prosecution engaged in abusive practices in 
refiling the charges. The Court determines that the prosecution has not engaged in forum 
shopping, the refiling does not appear to be a tactic to withhold evidence from the defense, and, 
based upon the original bindover by Judge Hilder, the charges are not groundless or improvident. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court denies the motion to dismiss, for while Brickey limits the State's ability to 
refile charges that have been dismissed for insufficient evidence, it does not intend to preclude 
refiling where a defendant's due process rights are not implicated. Absent abusive practices (e.g. 
forum shopping, groundless and improvident charges, withholding evidence), no presumptive 
bar to refile exits. Morgan, 2001 UT 87 ]} 16. And while a prosecutor's mistake may 
inconvenience the defense, due process is not concerned with ordinary levels of inconvenience 
because the "nature of the criminal justice system necessarily inconveniences those individuals 
who have been accused of crimes." Id at <[ 22 (quoting People v. Noline, 917 P.2d 1256, 1264 
(Colo. 1996)). 
DATED this / day of July, 2010. 
BYTHECOURT: ' - ' - ^ \ 
MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE. 
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